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I. Introduction
Any parent who has ever lost sight of his or her child for even five
minutes has experienced heart-stopping terror. Imagine, in compari-
son, losing a child for five days, five months, or five years.' Yet
thousands of American parents suffer this agony.2 "They are partners
in failed marriages who have legal custody rights of their children [b]ut
their former spouses have defied those rights, kidnapped their own
children and taken them abroad."3 In so doing, they have made the
life of the parent left behind a living hell, and have potentially scarred
the children for the remainder of their lives. 4
The need for a global solution to the problem of international
parental abduction had become urgent by the 1970s. Therefore, in
1976 the Hague Conference on Private International Law 5 began to
formulate the idea of a convention whose intended purpose was to
promote international cooperation amongst states6 in order to secure
the prompt return of children wrongfully taken out of their jurisdic-
tions. 7 The end result of this Conference was the creation of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion (Convention) which was unanimously adopted on October 25,
1980.8 On April 28, 1988, the U.S. Congress implemented the Interna-
1 139 CONG. REc. H10,313 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Mr. Schumer).
2 Id.; see also infra note 11.
3 139 CONG. REC. HIO,313 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Mr. Schumer).
4 See generally SALLY ABRAHMS, CHILDREN IN THE CROSSFIRE (1983).
5 See generally GLORIA F. DEHART, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO AP-
PLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION, WITH FORMs 9 n.23 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter GUIDE]
(describing the historical roots of the Conference as well as its current status in the interna-
tional community). The Hague Conference is a 100-year-old international organization of
member governments whose permanent bureau is located at the Hague, the Netherlands.
Id. The United States joined the Conference in 1964. 22 U.S.C. § 269g (1988).
6 "States" refers to either states or countries depending on the context throughout the
remainder of this Comment.
7 The concept of the Hague Convention stemmed from a Canadian proposal. For an
analysis of the historical evolution of the Convention, see generally Adair Dyer, Report on
International Child Abduction by One Parent ('Legal Kidnapping'), in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRI-
VATE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, III ACrES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATOPZAME SESSION 12 (1982)
[hereinafter Dyer Report].
8 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, held at The
Hague, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980) [hereinafter Hague Conven-
tion]. The Hague Convention was adopted by the 23 states present on October 1980. Elisa
Prez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, III Ac-
TES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATOREKAME SESSION I 1 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter Prez-Vera Report].
Since then the Convention has been ratified by 21 countries and acceded to by an additional
14. Carol S. Bruch, International Child Abduction Cases: Experiences Under the 1980 Hague Con-
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tional Child Abduction Remedies Act ,(ICARA). 9 ICARA enacted the
Hague Convention in the United States.' 0 The Hague Convention
was designed to respond to the growing problem l" of international
vention, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How To HAN-
DLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 1 (Sept. 30, 1993).
The ratifying countries, as of April 15, 1993, include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Can-
ada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia. Id. at n.4 (citing Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, Circular No. 2(93), No. 394(93)DY/A (Apr. 15, 1993)).
At the time of publication, one additional country-the Czech Republic-had also become a
signatory to the Hague Convention. Judicial Procedure Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Abduction,Jan. 1, 1993, U.S.-Czech Republic, 4 DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH, No. 14,
at 189, 222 (Apr. 5, 1993). In addition, for an update on the current status of Yugoslavia
under the Convention, see BUREAU OF CONSULAR ATFMIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNA-
TIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 4 (Aug. 1993).
The countries which have acceded to the Convention and have had their accessions
accepted by member countries (with indicated number of members accepting in parentheti-
cal), as of April 15, 1993, are: Belize (16), Burkina Faso (8), Ecuador (11), Hungary (18),
Mexico (18), Mauritius (0), Monaco (5), New Zealand (17), Poland (7), and Romania (6).
Bruch, supra at n.5. In addition, at the time of publication, the following countries have also
joined the aforementioned states in acceding to the Convention: Slovenia, Judicial Proce-
dure Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Mar. 22, 1994, U.S.-
Slovenia, 5 DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH, No. 27, at 459, 459 (July 4, 1994); Chile, Judicial Proce-
dure Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, U.S.-Chile, 5 DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH, No. 20, at 323, 323 (May 16, 1994); Panama,Judicial Procedure Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, U.S.-Pan., 5 DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH, No.
16, at 223, 223 (Apr. 18, 1994); Honduras, Judicial Procedure Convention on the Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 20, 1993, U.S.-Hond., 5 DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH,
No. 10, at 134, 134 (Mar. 7, 1994).
The purpose of the distinction between accession and ratification is that only nations
which have ratified the Convention can become signatories under Article 37. Hague Con-
vention, supra, art. 37. Accession, on the other hand, binds a country only as to those other
nations that declare their acceptance of the particular accession under Article 38. I& at art.
38.
9 The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988)
[hereinafter ICARA]. Although the Convention is self-executing (i.e., it does not require
implementing legislation for entry into effect), the United States opted for federal legislation
so that it could make the Convention fit more tightly within our federal system of laws. Peter
H. Pfund, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, the International Child Abduc-
tion Remedies Act, and the Need for Availability of Counselfor All Petitioners, 24 FAM. L.Q. 35, 42-43
(1990). The United States is unique in this respect. Id.
10 The Senate gave its advice and consent on October 9, 1986. Congressional hearings
on the international abduction problem were held in connection with the legislation. See
International Child Abduction Act: Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988). The ratification of the Convention was subject to two reservations: (1) that the
United States would not assume the court costs and counsel availability under the Conven-
tion; and (2) that all documents submitted to the U.S. Central Authority should be in their
English translation. Pfund, supra note 9, at 37-38. The Hague Convention was designated to
enter into effect, after the passage of the ICARA, see supra note 9, on July 1, 1988. See 53 Fed.
Reg. 23,843 (1988). On August 11 of the same year, the State Department's Bureau of Con-
sular Affairs was designated the U.S. Central Authority. See Exec. Order No. 12,648, 53 Fed.
Reg. 30,637 (1988). For a detailed chronological summary of the Hague Convention's ratifi-
cation in the United States, see GUIDE, supra note 5, at 14.
1I Parental abduction has become an international predicament of great magnitude
within the last decade. From 1973 to October 9, 1986, 2,184 international child abduction
cases were reported to the State Department. Over 1,500 of these abductions occurred in the
three year period between 1983 and 1986. 132 CONG. REc. S15,771 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986)
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child abduction by parents.1 2 Parties to the Hague Convention are ex-
pected to promptly return an abducted child to his country of "habit-
ual residence" 13 without addressing the merits of the competing
parental claims. 14 In this way, the Convention seeks to reduce the in-
centive for parents to seek alternative rulings from other courts (i.e.,
forum shopping). 15
Since its enactment, the Hague Convention has proven to be an
effective weapon in the struggle against parental abduction. 16
Tentative results seem to indicate that the Convention has not only
been successful in deterring parental kidnapping 17 but also in expedit-
ing, through the judicial system, the return of children who have
(statement of Sen. Denton). The State Department further estimates that since the 1970s
over 5,200 American children have either been abducted from the United States or pre-
vented from returning to the United States by one of their parents. BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION ii (Aug. 1993). As
of August 1993, the State Department had a total of oer 1,000 active cases on file. Id. Fur-
thermore, it is estimated that every week more than 8 children in the United States alone will
become the object of a parental abduction. Dateline: Against- Their Will (NBC television
broadcast, Sept. 8, 1992).
12 Although "abduction" typically appears in the criminal context, the Convention deals
only with the civil issues arising from international child abduction. The Convention, on the
other hand, speaks in terms of "wrongful removal" and "wrongful retention." Wrongful re-
moval, under the Convention, refers to the taking of a child from the person actually exercis-
ing custody of the child whereas wrongful retention occurs when a child is kept, usually after
a visit to the noncustodial parent, without the consent of the custodial parent. 51 Fed. Reg.
10,503 (1986). Throughout this Comment, the term "child snatching" will also be used inter-
changeably with these terms.
"Child snatching" occurs when a child has been removed or retained in breach of a
parent's custody rights. SANFORD N. KATz, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE
ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN 90 (1981). The breaching parent can either remove the child from
the child's habitual residence and take the child to a second jurisdiction, or retain the child
in the second jurisdiction after an authorized visit. Robin J. Frank, Comment, American and
International Responses to International Child Abductions, 16 N.Y.U. J. I'cr'L L. & POL 415, 415
(1984). -
13 See infra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
14 Hague Convention, supra note 8. art. 1. See also Public Notice 957, Hague Interna-
tional Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, at 10,504
(1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis].
15 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 1. For a general discussion on the need for
such a convention and its objectives, see Frank, supra note 12; Barbara R. Morgenstern, Com-
ment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: The Need for
Ratification, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 463 (1985); Dana R. Rivers, Comment, The Hague
International Child Convention and The International Child Abduction Remedies Act: Closing Doors to
the Parent Abductor, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 589 (1989).
16 Bruch, supra note 8, at 2 n.8 (citing Jack Markey, Statistical Report of the United
States Central Authority for the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (Oct. 15, 1991)):
The U.S. State Department reports that during the first 3 years of the Conven-
tion's operation in the United States, 96% of the completed cases involving a
request for the child's return from the United States resulted in the child's
return (either by agreement or by court order), and 86% of applications seek-
ing return of children to the United States were similarly successful.
Id.
17 SeeAndy N. Khan, Child Abduction and Custody, 16 FAM. L. 114, 116 (1986) (arguing
that the impact in Switzerland has had a deterrent effect). See also Adair Dyer, The Hague
Child Abduction Convention - Past, Present and Future, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTER-
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL ABDUCTION
been abducted.18
Despite glowing statistical assertions, 19 the fact remains that many
children are still being used as pawns in the adult game of divorce. 20
While the Hague Convention has the potential to become a most effec-
tive weapon against international parental abduction, public and judi-
cial awareness are required in order to achieve this result. 'Judges
must become familiar with the [C]onvention and its procedures be-
cause they take precedence in any case where they are applicable."
2 1
Family law lawyers, likewise, must acquaint themselves with the Con-
vention's provisions in order to "intelligently advise clients."22 Subse-
quent case law must be disseminated effectively to all of the
Convention's party states so that the treaty's tenets can be consistently
applied across international boundaries. 23 Ultimately, it is through
these publicized activities and a general heightened awareness that
many would-be abductors will hopefully be swayed. 24
This Comment is intended to provide an overview of the basic in-
formation necessary to adequately understand the Hague Convention
from the viewpoint of both the bench and the practitioner. The analy-
sis beginsby examining the state of U.S. law prior to the adoption of
the Convention, including a brief overview of two statutory enact-
ments-the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 25 and
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 26 The Comment will
then proceed with an in-depth discussion of the Hague Convention's
provisions by focusing on the language of the instrument, its underly-
NATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 10
(Sept. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Dyer Remarks].
18 Dyer Remarks, supra note 17, at 17. See also Bruch, supra note 8, at 2 n.8. The State
Department reports that between July 1, 1988 and October 15, 1991, 335 Hague Convention
applications were received by its Office requesting the return of children abducted from the
United States. Of these applications, 153 were resolved, either voluntarily or through court
order, by July of 1993. Id.
19 See supra note 18.
20 See supra note 11.
21 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 2. See also, Hon. James D. Garbolino, The Cause of Action for
Return Under the Hague Convention When a Child Is Abducted to the United States: A View From the
Bench, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How TO HAN-
DLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 28 (Sept. 30, 1993) ("Mostjudges are currently
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Convention, and some are unaware of its application to
family law cases.").
22 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 2.
23 Failure to consistently apply some of the more ambiguously worded provisions of the
Convention, while keeping in mind the primary purposes sought to be achieved,' would un-
dermine the Convention's "value as a vehicle for the return of children wrongfully removed
or retained ... ." Linda Silberman, Hague International Child Abduction: A Progress Report, in
NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE INTER.
NATIONAL CHILD ABDUCrION CASES 7 (July 26, 1993).
24 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 2.
25 UNIF. CHILD CUSTODYJURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968)' [hereinafter UCCJA].
26 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 653-655, 663 (1982), and 18 U.S.C. § 1073
(1982)) [hereinafter PKPA].
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ing principles and aims, and an analysis of the current case law. Fi-
nally, the remaining obstacles to enforcement will be briefly examined
and suggestions will be made regarding how the Convention's scope
and efficacy can be fully optimized.
II. Child Abduction Prior to the Hague Convention in the United
States
In recent years, the problem of international child abduction has
received the increased attention of many family law scholars.2 7 The
primary intent of this Comment is not to focus on the history of the
international child abduction problem and possible legal remedies;
these topics having been thoroughly and expertly discussed else-
where.2 8 Instead, the Hague Convention constitutes the ultimate focus
of this work. However, in order to place the passage of the Hague
Convention and its main provisions in proper context, a brief overview
of the growth of the problem of international child abduction is
required.
A. Historical Development of Custody Jurisdiction: Pre-1968
Historically, the problem of parental child abduction was dealt
with primarily on the national level. In the United States, prior to the
adoption of uniform national law, i.e., the UCCJA, child custody law
was fraught with much ambiguity and confusion.2 9 State courts often
refused to enforce the custody decisions of other jurisdictions, 30 and
justified not extending comity to another state's or country's awards on
the basis of the interlocutory nature of the grant and the "best interests
of the child."31
The non-deferential treatment of foreign custody orders created a
27 See GUIDE, supra note 5; Patricia Hoff, An Overview of Legal Remedies in Interstate and
International Child Custody and Parental Kidnapping Cases, in LEGAL REMEDIES IN PARENTAL KiD-
NAPPING CAsES: A COLLECTION OF MATERIALS 1 (ABA Monograph, 5th ed. 1986); A.E. Anton,
The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 537 (1981).
28 See Hoff, supra note 27; John M. Eekelaar, International Child Abduction by Parents, 32
U. TORONTO L.J. 281 (1982); Esther L. Blynn, Comment, In Re: International Child Abduction
v. Best Interest of the Child: Comity Should Control. 18 U. MIAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 353 (1986).
29 Christopher Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291,
291-97 (1986).
30 Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 464. See, e.g., Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d
431 (D.C. 1972) (refusing to recognize foreign decree because of original forum's lack of
personal jurisdiction); Anderson v. Anderson, 234 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 1970) (ignoring foreign
custody order and remanding case for decision on the merits).
31 Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 465 ("[Alwards are not final, but remain modifiable
based on the current best interests of the child."). See also Middleton v. Middleton, 314
S.E.2d 362, 366 (Va. 1984) (discussing problems prior to the adoption of the Uniform Child
CustodyJurisdiction Act). The courts felt free to modify custody decrees on the grounds that
circumstances surrounding the home environment had changed. Id Courts of several states
acted in isolation of one another, often simultaneously awarding custody of the same child to
different parents. Id.
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conducive environment for child snatching 2 Parents who were dis-
gruntled with a custody decision in one state had only to move to an-
other state to receive an opportunity to obtain a more favorable
outcome. Forum shopping was further facilitated by the jurisdictional
rules33 which allowed for custody jurisdiction to be established on a
number of different grounds: "(a) the child's physical presence; (b)
the child's domicile; (c) the physical presence and/or domicile of one
or both parents; or (d) the continuing rights or jurisdiction in a court
rendering an initial decree."3 4 Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court, in a series of cases decided between 1947 and 1962, further en-
couraged such self-help remedies3 5 by declining to interpret the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution3 6 as a man-
date to the states to recognize and enforce the custody decrees of
other states.37
B. The National Uniform Legislation Emerges: Post-1968
Because states were not required as a matter of comity to enforce
other states' custody decrees, a "no-mans land" was created in the law
where parents could escape an adverse ruling and secure a more
favorable decision simply by going to a neighboring state or country.38
As a result of this increased risk of self-help procedures, in the late
1960s practitioners and the states began to address the confusion that
had been prevalent in this area of the law. The focus of this attention
culminated in passage of two acts of legislation: the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),39 which was framed in a combina-
tion effort by the ABA Family Law Section and the Commissioners of
Uniform Laws, 40 and has subsequently been adopted by all fifty
32 Barbara U. Scherwin, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Practi-
cal Application, 10 Loy. L.A. lNr'L & Comp. L.J. 163, 168 (1988).
33 The parent who had physical possession of the child often had a tactical advantage
because courts based their jurisdiction on the mere presence of the child. Middleton, 314
S.E.2d at 366-67. Therefore, parents would often kidnap a child in order to obtain posses-
sion. Id. Once the child was abducted, the custodial parent would have to relitigate in the
forum where the child was now present. Scherwin, supra note 32, at 168. If a foreign country
was involved, the alien parent would be confronted with additional problems: added ex-
pense, language barriers, a less sympathetic court system, and obtaining local counsel. Mid-
dleton, 314 S.E.2d at 367. The abducting parent, therefore, had a strong motivation to take
the child to a more sympathetic forum. Id.
34 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 4.
35 Scherwin, supra note 32, at 166; GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3-4.
36 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
37 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 538 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). See generally GUIDE,
supra note 5, at 3-4 (describing the Supreme Court's Halvey, Kovaks v. Brewer, and Ford deci-
sions and their impact on the child custody law preceding the Hague Convention).
38 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 4.
39 UCCJA, supra note 25.
40 See Bridgette M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 F~m. L.Q.
304, 304 (1969). For a discussion of the jurisdictional nature of the UCCJA, see also
19941
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states;4 1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) ,42 which
was enacted in 1980 and was designed to supplement the UCCJA.43
The UCCJA was enacted to address primarily the problems of in-
terstate abductions, 4 4 but also extended its reach to international ab-
ductions. 45 In particular, section 23 of the UCCJA states that:
[T]he general policies of this Act extend to the international arena.
The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement
.of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees
involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody institutions reh-
dered by appropriate authorities of other nations if reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard were given to all affected persons.
46
Importantly, the Act eliminated many of the advantages that pa-
rental abductors had gained from forum shopping, and provided
greater certainty that prior custody hearings would not be disre-
garded.47 The UCCJA attempted to achieve this objective by limiting
jurisdiction of custody suits to a single state.48 The Act only allowed a
state court to assert jurisdiction under a limited number of circum-
stances: (1) if it sits in the child's home state, 49 (2) if the state had a
Bridgette M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction
under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203 (1981).
41 GUIDE, supra note 5, at 5.
42 PKPA, supra note 26, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 653-655, 663 (1982), and 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982)).
43 Since the primary focus of this Comment is the Hague Convention, a discussion of
the PKPA will not ensue. Such an omission is justified by the fact that the PKPA is limited-to
domestic abductions. See Elizabeth C. MacDonald, Note, More Than Mere Child's Play: Interna-
tional Parental Abduction of Children, 6 DIc. J. INT'L L. 283, 295 (1988) ("While the PKPA
contains several provisions that may assist a parent whose child has been wrongfully taken,
application of these provisions is confined to cases arising within the United States; the PKPA
is not applicable to international parental abduction disputes."). In addition, the discussion
of the UCCJA's provisions should provide the reader with an adequate contextual basis for
understanding U.S. legislation. However, if additional information is sought, see Cathy S.
Helzick, Note, Returning United States Children Abducted to Foreign Countries: The Need to Imple-
ment the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ.
119, 125-32 (1987) (discussing the relationship between, and differences in, the UCCJA and
the PKPA).
44 For a discussion of the purposes sought to be achieved by the passage of the UCCJA,
see Scherwin, supra note 32, at 168-69. 'See also supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
45 UCCJA, supra note 25, § 23.
46 Id. However, it is important to note that not all states adopted this section of the
model act. See WalterJ. Wadlington, Virginia Domestic Relations Law: Recent Developments, 68
VA. L. REv. 507, 515 n.57 (1982).
47 Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 467.
48 Id. See also UCCJA, supra note 25, § 1(3):
[The main purpose of the UCCJA is to] assure that litigation concerning the
custody of a child take[s] place ordinarily in the state with which the child and
his family have the closest connection and where significant evidence . . . is
most readily available, and that courts ... decline the exercise of jurisdiction
when the child and his family have closer connection with another state.
Id.
49 Id. "[H]ome state" is defined as "the state in which the child immediately preceding
the time involved lived with his parents . .. for at least six consecutive months, and in the
case of a child less than six months old the state in which the child lived from birth with any
of the persons mentioned." Id. § 2(5).
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significant connection with the child and its family,50 (3) if the child
was present in the state and was abandoned or subject to or threatened
with abuse or neglect,51 or (4) no other state would have or assume
jurisdiction under section (1), (2), or (3).52 Regardless of which of
these jurisdictional bases is used to establish the authority of the court
to hear the matter, the child's presence alone is not determinative.5 3
Although the UCCJA effectively eliminates some instances of fo-
rum shopping, it still contains many legislative and judicial loop-
holes.54 While it has generated cooperation among sister states, it has
failed to achieve uniformity in judicial determinations and interpreta-
tions and thus its deterrent effect has been undermined.55 In addi-
tion, the courts have avoided the provisions of the UCCJA by raising
constitutional questions as to its preconditions. 5 6 Judges have inconsis-
tently and narrowly construed some of the UCCJA's provisions57 and
expanded their discretionary reign in other areas5 8 so as to allow them-
selves authority to hear the merits. 59 The states have also added to the
confusion, and further decreased the effectiveness of the UCCJA, by
adopting varying versions of the act.6°
In international custody disputes, additional problems as to the
scope of the UCCJA exist and effectively leave many cases outside of
the periphery of the law. The UCCJA applies only to international cus-
tody cases where the custodial parent asks the forum state to recognize
and enforce a foreign decree. 61 The Act fails to provide a remedy
where the noncustodial parent takes a child from the United States to
another country.6 2 Additionally, the Act applies only when an official
custody order existed prior to the abduction and the abducting parent
50 Id. § 3(a)(2).
51 Id. § 3(a)(3).
52 Id. § 3(a)(4).
53 I. § 3(a).
54 GuIDE, supra note 5, at 6.
55 Rivers, supra note 15, at 607-08.
56 Id. at 606. For example, the law is currently unsettled as to how the "reasonable
notice and opportunity" requirement of § 23 of the UCCJA is to be interpreted in light of
constitutional due process constraints. Id. at 606-07 (citing Miller v. Superior Court, 587
P.2d 723, 745 (Cal. 1978)).
57 See e.g., Klien v. Klien, 533 N.Y.S.2d 211, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (refusing to consider
Israel a "state").
58 MacDonald, supra note 43, at 294 (discussing the dilution of the UCCJA's deterrent
effect due to the broad discretion granted the courts).
59 For a general discussion of the problems still faced under the UCCJA, see Morgen-
stern, supra note 15, at 469-70.
60 Id. at 470.
61 Id. at 469-70.
62 See UCCJA, supra note 25, Prefatory Note (UCCJA not a reciprocal law). See also,
Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 472-73:
When children are taken from the United States, however, it is less likely that a
United States custody order will be enforced abroad....
Most countries adhere to the principle that their courts have jurisdiction
to render custody decisions despite a foreign judgment, if the child is in that'
country. Although the "best interests of the child" standard is applied in most
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tries to legitimize his or her custody in another forum.63 It fails to
deter those who had no intention of legitimizing their custody in a
foreign country.64 Despite the enactment of the UCCJA and other do-
mestic legislation, there remained, up until the passage of the Hague
Convention, the need for international cooperation to address the
problem of international child abduction since national legislation
had proven itself to be an inadequate remedy. 65
III. An International Solution: Analysis of the Hague Convention
The underlying principle of the Hague Convention is to secure a
swift return of the abducted child to the state in which the child was a
habitual resident without undertaking a full investigation of the merits
of the abductor's case. 66 The aim is to restore the status quo. 67
[Moreover,] [t]he Convention creates a very strong presumption that
the child's interests are harmed by wrongful removal or retention as
defined in the Convention, and that the appropriate place for tranquil
consideration by a court of the child's best interests is in the place of
habitual residence before the removal or retention. 68
The Hague Convention has been heralded as a novel and unique
approach to the problem of parental -abductions because it avoids the
difficulties encountered in requiring the enforcement of an existing
custody decree; instead, it allows a court to determine whether to or-
der a child returned irrespective of whether a decree exists or not.69
Therefore, unlike the European Convention, 70 the Inter-American
countries, the United States cannot compel a foreign country to honor a
United States award based on the same standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
63 UCCJA, supra note 25, § 1 (a) (2).
64 Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 470.
65 In addition to the Hague Convention, there are two other conventions designed to
deal with the problem of international abduction: the European Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Child Custody and on Restoration of Custody of
Children, May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 273 [hereinafter European Convention], and the Inter-
American Convention on the International -Return of Children, July 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 63.
Both require an enforceable decree for their application. The United States, in addition, is
not a party to either convention. For a discussion of these conventions, see GERALDINE: VAN
BUEREN, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD - INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON CHILD ABDUC-
TION 25-32 (1993) and Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 475-78.
66 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. See also Anton, supra note 27, at 543
("These wider objects, however, are subsidiary to the primary purpose of the Convention,
namely, as Article 1 (a) states, to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to
or retained in any Contracting State.").
67 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,505.
68 Caroline LeGette, Note, International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention: Emerg-
ing Practice and Interpretation of the Discretionary Exception, 25 TEx. LJ. 287, 294 (1990) (quoting
Adair Dyer, International Conventions on Custody and Visitation: Problems and Oppor-
tunites, Address Before the International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 13 (une 27,
1987)). According to Dyer, the basic technique incorporated in the Convention has been
adequately labelled "restoration of custody." Dyer Remarks, supra note 17, at 3.
69 See, e.g., Eekelaar, supra note 28, at 305.
70 European Convention, supra note 65, at 273.
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Convention, 7 1 the UCCJA, 72 and the PKPA,73 the Hague Convention
does not require the existence of an enforceable custody order for it to
operate. 74 The Convention is further designed to compel the abduct-
ing parent to return the child voluntarily to the place of habitual resi-
dency;75 if the abductor refuses, the Convention provides procedures
for the court to order a child's return.7 6 Succinctly put, the objectives
of the Convention are as follows:
The Convention's approach to the problem of international child ab-
duction is a simple one. The Convention is designed promptly to re-
store the factual situation that existed prior to a child's removal or
retention. It does not seek to settle disputes about legal custody
rights, nor does it depend upon the existence of court orders as a
condition for returning children. The international abductor is de-
nied legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in the coun-
try where the child is located, as resort to the Convention is to effect
the swift return to his or her circumstances before the abduction or
retention. In most cases this will mean return to a country of the
child's habitual residence where any disputes in custody rights can be
heard and settled.
77
Inherent in the philosophical underpinnings of the Convention is
the notion that strict application and interpretation of the provisions
are paramount to deter future abductions. 78 If the courts fail to con-
sistently interpret the Convention, it would result not only in the un-
dermining of its value in deterring parental abductions7 9 but could
also allow the Convention to become subject to varying national ap-
proaches and perspectives which would hinder the attainment of the
core objectives80 set forth in the treaty.8 ' Therefore, it is imperative
71 Inter-American Convention on the International Return of the Child, supra note 65,
at 63.
72 UCCJA, supra note 25.
73 PKPA, supra note 26, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified at 28 US.C. § 1738A
(1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 653-655, 663 (1982), and 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982)).
74 See Eekelaar, supra note 28, at 305.
75 Hague Convention, supra note 8, art. 7.
76 Id.
77 Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), reprinted in 51
Fed. Reg. 10,494, at 10,495 (1986).
78 As George Schultz, in his capacity as Secretary of State, stated:
If the Convention machinery succeeds in rapidly restoring children to their
pre-abduction or pre-retention circumstances, it will have the desirable effect
of deterring parental kidnapping, as the legal and other incentive [s] for wrong-
ful removal or retention will have been eliminated. Indeed, while it is hoped
that the Convention will be effective in returning the child in individual cases,
the full extent of its success may never by [sic] quantifiable as an untold number
of potential kidnappings may be deterred.
Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, at
10,497 (1986).
79 Silberman, supra note 23, at 7.
80 The stated objectives of the Hague Convention are:
a. [Tit secure the prompt return [of] children wrongfully removed to or re-
tained in any Contracting State; and
b. [T]o insure the rights of custody and of access under the law of one Con-
tracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States.
Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 1.
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that the judiciary, family law practitioners,8 2 and others who are in-
volved in the process of this type of "particularized litigation"83 exhibit
a firm grasp on the "intricacies" of the Convention8 4 and the mounting
case law that has been accumulating since its inception.8 5 The follow-
ing analysis attempts to provide those individuals confronted with the
issue of international parental abduction, in the legal context, with an
overview of the Hague Convention and its application.
A. The Structure of the Convention-An Overview
The actual text of the Hague Convention consists of six chapters
and contains forty-five articles. 86 The preamble states that "the inter-
ests of children are of paramount importance" in custody matters and
right of access. 87 The underlying purpose for accomplishing the
child's swift return is to avoid assimilation of the child into the strange
environment which could lead to subsequent separation difficulties. 88
In addition, because the safety of the child is the paramount concern,
the Convention envisions the child's prompt return to his or her habit-
ual residence. 89 Hence, the Hague Conference proceeded with a con-
vention that is procedural and jurisdictional in nature.90 The
Convention does not offer uniform international standards for deter-
mining custody rights nor does it provide for the enforcement of cus-
tody decrees rendered by another foreign state.91 The Convention is
81 Silberman, supra note 23, at 77.
82 It has been noted by some commentators that the knowledge of the family law attor-
ney is especially important in this regard because he or she often will be faced with the
responsibility of educating the bench on the provisions and proper application of the Con-
vention. See Robert D. Arenstein, The Anatomy of a Hague Case When a Child[ren] has been
Abducted to the United States, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
TION: How TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 1 (Sept. 30, 1993). This is
imperative in countries, such as the United States, where custody disputes are heard at the
district court level and where the judges expertise is expected to span a multitude of civil and
criminal issues and who generally may not hear many cases of this sort. Interview with Betty
Mahmoody, Co-Author of NOT WITHOUT My DAUGHTER and FOR THE LOVE OF A CHILD as well
as President and Co-Founder of One World : For Children (Jan. 5, 1994) [hereinafter
Mahmoody Interview] (Ms. Mahmoody has been certified by many state courts as an expert
witness on international child abductions and the Hague Convention.).
83 Garbolino, supra note 21, at 28.
84 Id.
85 Since 1980, over 300 court decisions from at least 15 different countries have ex-
amined the Hague Convention's provisions. Dyer Remarks, supra note 17, at 11.
86 Hague Convention, supra note 8.
87 Id. at pmbl.
88 VAN BUEREN, supra note 65, at 17.
89 Anton, supra note 27, at 543-44 ("The Commission started from the assumption that
the abduction of a child will generally be prejudicial to its welfare.... Th[e] return should be
prompt.").
90 See Bridgette M. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child Ab-
duction, 14 FAm. L.Q. 99, 102-03 (1980) (discussing the procedural nature of the Conven-
tion); Dyer Report, supra note 7, at 46-48 (discussing expedited return of child as a better
remedy than enforcement of custody orders in international child abduction cases).
91 Compare this approach to that of the European Convention, supra note 65, whose
main thrust is the enforcement of decrees and which only applies if there is a custody deci-
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merely designed to address the issue of whether there has been a
"wrongful removal" of a child from one country to another or a
"wrongful retention," and if so, to provide adequate procedures by
which to obtain 'the presence of:the child in the place of "habitual
residence."9 2 Then, and only then, may the issue of the underlying
merits be considered. 93 Countries adhering to the Convention 94 agree
to return all wrongfully removed or retained children to the state of
the child's habitual residence so that the authorities there may offici-
ate the custody dispute.95
I The crux of the Convention is set forth in Articles 3 and 12. Arti-
cle 3 defines a "wrongful removal or retention" as a breach of rights of
custodym under the habitual residence state's laws if those rights have
been actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so
if the removal or retention had not occurred.9 6 Article 12 provides the
remedy once a "wrongful removal or retention" has been found to
have occurred. 9 7 The remedial action ordered depends upon the time
frame in which the action has been brought. If the proceeding was
initiated within one year of the child's abduction, judicial authorities
within the Contracting State. are required to return the child "forth-
with." 98 On the other hand, if proceedings were initiated subsequent
to the one year deadline, the authorities are only required to return
the child if the child has not settled in its new environment. 99
Persons who oppose the return of the child to the "habitual resi-
dence" under the treaty are limited in their number of possible de-
fenses. Articles 12,100 13,101 and 20102 set forth the available
exceptions to the return of the child. Such defenses include alleging
that: (i) the petitioner had no right of custody or access at the time of
the removal or retention; 10 3 (ii) the petitioner acquiesced to the re-
moval or retention;10 4 (iii) the petitioner failed to exercise his' or her
right of custody;10 5  (iv) a "grave risk" of harm to the child would
Sion already in force. For a. more detailed comparison of the child abduction conventions,
see Eekelaar, supra.note 28, at 321-25..
92 Brian L. Webb & Diana S. Friedman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduc-
tion, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 6 (Sept. 30, 1993).
93 Id.
94 See supra note 8.
95 Webb & Friedman, supra note 92, at 6.
96 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3. See also infra notes 127-34 and accompany-
ing text.
97 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 12.
98 Id. See also infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
99 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 12.
100 Id.
101 Id. at art. 13.
102 Id. at art. 20.
103 Id. at arts. 3 and 21.
104 Id. at art. 13(a).
105 Id.
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result from the return of the child to the state of habitual residence or
the child would be placed "in an intolerable situation";106 (v) the child
is settled in a new environment; 10 7 (vi) return "would not be permitted
by the fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms";108 or (vii) the
child is of the appropriate age and maturity and objects to the re-
turn. 10 9 Although these exceptions are provided within the ambit of
the Convention, in light of Article 19, they are meant to encompass a
narrow focus so as to prohibit the making of custody decisions at this
level. 110
Procedurally, the Convention sets forth the creation of a Central
Authority within each Contracting State to facilitate the parental ab-
duction proceedings."1 The Central Authority is responsible for vari-
ous receiving and outgoing duties. 112 The incoming request duties,
which are defined in Article 7, include locating an abducted child, in-
stituting proceedings to effect a return, assisting in the administrative
technicalities of a safe return, providing information concerning the
laws of a state or background of a child in conjunction with an applica-
tion, providing legal assistance and counsel, and endeavoring to amica-
bly resolve a kidnapping situation.113 Responsibilities of the Central
Authority also arise in relation to outgoing applications (i.e., applica-
tion seeking the return of children who have been taken to one of the
Convention's Contracting States). 114 Article 8 states that a complain-
ant may file an application at either the Central Authority of the
106 Id. at art. 13(b).
107 Id. at art. 12.
108 Id. at art. 20.
109 Id. at art. 13.
110 Article 19 of the Convention provides that "[a] decision under this Convention con-
cerning the return of that child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any
custody issue." I. at art. 19. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,509:
[T] he representatives of countries participating in negotiations on the Conven-
tion were aware that any exceptions had to be drawn very narrowly lest their
application undermine the express purposes of the Convention-to effect the
prompt return of abducted children. Further, it was generally believed that
courts would understand and fulfill the objectives of the Convention by nar-
rowly interpreting the exceptions and allowing their use only in clearly merito-
rious cases, and only when the person opposing return had met the burden of
proof.... The courts retain the discretion to order the child returned even if
they consider that one or more of the exceptions applies.
Id.
111 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6. In the United States, there is a single
Central Authority-the Office of the Citizens' and Consular Services which is located within
the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. For an in-depth discussion of the opera-
tion of the Central Authority in the United States, see Pfund, supra note 9, at 45-51.
112 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 7-9. "Central authorities" are the adminis-
trative, channeling bodies within each Contracting State designed to process applications
under the Convention and ultimately assist in the procurement of the child within the "habit-
ual state" by assisting in the legal aspects of a Hague application. Anton, supra note 27, at
547.
113 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 7.
114 Id. at arts. 8 and 9.
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL ABDUCTION
child's habitual residence or with any other Contracting State.11 5 If
the application is received by the "habitual residence" state's Central
Authority, it must forward the complaint to the Contracting State
where the child is believed to be.1 16 It is important to note that the use
of a Central Authority under the Convention is optional, and a party
may bypass these authorities by bringing an action on their own
behalf. 1 17
B. General Conditions for the Applicability of the Convention: The
Substantive Issues and Elements
Certain conditions must be present for the Convention to be ap-
plicable. These conditions are enumerated in articles 3, 4, and 35 of
the Convention and require the complainant to show:'1 8 (1) that a
child under the age of sixteen (16) years; 119 (2) was removed from the
child's state of "habitual residence,"1 20 in breach of a "right of custody"
attributable to the left-behind parent1 21 which the parent had been
exercising 122 at the time of the wrongful removal;1 23 and (3) the Con-
vention must have been in effect between the state of habitual resi-
dence (i.e., home state) 124 and the haven state' 25 immediately
preceding the child's wrongful removal or retention.' 2 6
1. Wrongfulness of the Removal or Retention
Courts deciding the merits of an application made pursuant to the
Hague Convention will be determining in each instance whether a
child should be returned to a foreign jurisdiction. 127 Most cases will
require the court to rule on the threshold issue of whether the removal
or retention was wrongful.' 28
Wrongful removal typically occurs where a child who habitually
resides within the home state is taken to another Contracting State, the
115 Id. at art. 8.
116 Id. at art. 9.
117 Id. at art. 29. See also GUIDE, supra note 5, at 59 ("Where the location of the child is
known, an attorney has been retained, and immediate action is necessary or desirable, direct
application to a court... may be the best and most expeditious way to proceed. In such a
case, the United States Central Authority wishes to be advised .. ").
118 Under the implementing legislation of the United States, the burden of proof re-
quired to make a case in chief under the Hague Convention is a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (1988).
119 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 4.
120 Id. at art. 1.
121 Id. at arts. 3 and 5.
122 Id. at art. 3.
123 Id.
124 "Home state" is used to refer to the state of habitual residence.
125 "Haven state" is used to refer to the country to which the child was taken.
126 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 35.
127 Dyer Remarks, supra note 17, at 3.
128 Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 64.
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haven state, by a parent who does not have custody of him. 129 Wrong-
ful retention, on the other hand, typically results when a parent who
has legal visitation with the child keeps the child out of the home state
beyond the period for which access rights have been agreed upon or
set.130 The Convention defines a "'wrongful retention or removal" to
exist where:
a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institu-
tion or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of
the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and
b. at the time of the removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been" so exercised
but for the removal or retention.
[Furthermore,] [tihe rights of custody mentioned in subparagraph a
above may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a
judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement hav-
ing legal effect under the law of the State.13 1
In order to determine whether the action committed by one party
was wrongful within the meaning of the Convention, the court, in turn,
must rule on several distinct questions: (1) which state constitutes the
child's habitual residence;132 (2) what are the sources of custody rights
under which the applicant claims a right to return exist;133 and (3)
whether those rights were actually being exercised at the time of re-
moval or retention.13 4
a. What Constitutes "Habitual Residence"?
The Hague Convention applies only if the child was a "habitual
resident" of a "Contracting State immediately before any breach of cus-
tody or access rights."13 5 Neither the Convention nor. the accompany-
ing legal analysis, however,; define the term habitual residence, and
according to the Commentators, this was not an oversight.136 The
Convention instead chose to characterize habitual residence as a "well-
129 Jean-Marc Neault, The Treatment of Cases of International Child Abduction by Par-
ents in Canada,,and in Particular Quebec 13 (Sept. 30, 1993).
130 l
131 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3.
132 See infra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
133 See infra notes* 164-91 and accompanying text.
134 See infra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
135 Hague Convention supra note 8, at art. 4.
136 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 53. See also In re Bates, No. CA 122/89 (Fain. Feb.
23, 1989) (U.K.), available in Hilton House BBS, File Bates.UK. The English Court noted in
Bates that:
[n]o definition of 'habitual residence' has ever been included in a Hague Con-
vention; this has been a matter of deliberate policy, the aim being to leave the
notion free from technical rules which can produce rigidity and inconsistencies
as between legal systems.
It is greatly to be hoped that the courts will resist the temptation to
develop detailed and restrictive rules as to habitual residence which might
make it as technical a term' of art as common law domicile. The facts and
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established concept in -the Hague Conference, which regards it as a
question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile." 137 The
term, thus, was left to be flexibly applied by the courts without the
unnecessary constraints of a standardized meaning.' 38
Habitual residence is not necessarily defined by a specific period
of time; instead, it is more a state of being or a state of mind.' 39 In this
regard, the Convention differs from other schemes which require a
minimum period of time for a state to become the child's home
state.' 40 Habitual residence could technically be established after only
one day. 14' The general view, however, is that "habitual residence" is
the place which is the focus of the child's life, where the child is per-
manently and physically present, and where the child's day-to-day exist-
ence is centered.14 2 Therefore, cases interpreting the term have
deemed the question to be a factual inquiry which depends upon the
particular case's circumstances.143 Factors which courts have consid-
ered relevant include: whether the custodial parent actually consentedto allow a child to live with the other parent;' 4 whether a custodial
parent was candid and truthful in his stated intentions to live sepa-
rately in another state;145 and the length of time the child has been a
resident of the jurisdiction.1 46 In short,
there must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one
or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law
requires is that there is a settled purpose. That is not to say that the
propositus intends to stay where he is indefinitely. Indeed his purpose
while settled may be for a limited period. Education, business or pro-
fession, employment, health, family or merely love of the place may
spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode, and
there may well be many others. All that is necessary is that the pur-
circumstances of each case should continue to be assessed without resort to
presumptions or presuppositions....
Id. (quoting ALBERT V. DicEy & JOHN H.C. MoRRs, DicEY AND MORIS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 166-67 (11th ed. 1987)).
137 Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 66.
138 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139 Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1'78.
140 Compare UCCJA, supra note 25, § 3, and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), which allow the court to exercise jurisdiction if it is the
child's home state for a continuous period of six months.
141 See Zenel v. Haddow, 1993 S.L.T. 975, 979 (Scot. 1st Div.) ("A person may cease to be
habitually resident in country A in a single day if he or she leavies it with a settled intention
not to return to it ... "); Cohen v. Cohen, 600 N.Y.S.2d 996, 996 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (The Cohen
court raised, but left unanswered, the following question: whether one party may change
their mind as to a move to another country and thereby negate an apparent change in the
child's habitual residence.).
142 Webb & Friedman, supra note 92, at 10 (citing Adair Dyer, Remarks at Briefing at
Hague Child Abduction Convention and Related Federal Legislation Uan. 6-7, 1989)).
14 See, e.g., Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D. Kan. 1993) (citing Meredith
v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1433 (D. Ariz. 1991)).
144 Mazerolle v. Mazerolle, No. 30-85-60, 1992 WL 155458, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
29, 1992).
145 Levesque, 816 F. Supp. at 666.
146 See, e.g., Klam v. Kam, 797 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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pose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to
be properly described as settled.' 4 7
The concept of habitual residence, however, should not be con-
fused with the concept of "domicile." 148 The drafters of the Conven-
tion expressly rejected this approach because they feared the formal
technicalities used in determining domicile would hamper the courts
in attempting to determine habitual residence.1 49 The rejection of the
domicile approach was reemphasized in Friedrich v. Friedrich,150 which
concluded that the aims of the Convention should prevail in defining
habitual residence.15 1 In Friedrich, the child's mother was a U.S. citizen
and member of the armed forces stationed in Germany, and the father
was a German citizen. 152 Although the child had resided exclusively in
Germany until he was removed to the United States by his mother in
the absence of his father's knowledge, the mother argued that her
child was a habitual resident of the United States because he was a U.S.
citizen, his permanent address for U.S. documentation was in the
United States, and the mother intended to' return to the United States
upon her discharge from the armed forces. t 53 The district court re-
fused to return the child.1 54 The lower court ruled that because the
father had ordered his wife to leave the house with their son, thus forc-
ing the mother to obtain temporary housing on a U.S. army base, the
child's habitual residence instantly became the United States. As a re-
sult, relief under the Convention was deemed unavailable to the
father. 155
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court. The court rejected the mother's arguments15 6 and noted that
147 In re Bates, No. CA 122/89 (Fam. Feb. 23, 1989) (U.K.) (quoting Reg. v. Barnet
London Borough Council, 2 App. Gas. 309, 344 (1983) (Lord Scarman)), available in Hilton
House BBS, File Bates.UK. In Bata, the court went on to hold that 3 months is a sufficient
period of time to establish the child's habitual residence. Id. For examples of U.S. cases
relying on the Bates decision, see Levesque, 816 F. Supp. at 666; Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983
F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
148 Domicile is defined as follows:
The home of the parents. That which arises from a man's birth and connec-
tions. The domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed 'dom-
icile of origin,' constitutes the domicile of an infant, and continues until
abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (abr. 6th ed. 1990).
149 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. See also Silberman, supra note 23, at 29.
150 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). The Friedrich court stated: "[t]o determine the habit-
ual residence, the court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experi-
ence, not future intentions." Id. at 1401.
151 See generally Mark Dorosin, Note, You Must Go Home Again: Friedrich v. Friedrich,
The Hague Convention and The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 18 N.C. J. Ir'L L. &
CoM. REG. 743, 754-55 (1993) (discussing how the Court reversed the decision below based
upon the underlying principles established in the Convention).
152 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398.
153 Id. at 1401.
154 Id. at 1400.
55 Id.
156 See supra text accompanying note 153.
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while such arguments may be persuasive to find legal residence (i.e.,
domicile), they fell far short of establishing a habitual residence
claim.1 57 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily
upon the fact that the child had resided almost exclusively in Germany
until he was removed, without his father's knowledge or consent, to
the United States. 1 58  Similarly, the court of appeals also rejected the
mother's contention that habitual residence is based on which parent
is providing the care and support for the child.159 In this regard, the
court noted the following:
More fundamentally, [the child's] habitual residence in Germany is
not predicated on the care or protection provided by his German fa-
ther nor does it shift to the United States when his American mother
assumes the role of primary caretaker. Habitual residence can be "al-
tered" only by a change in geography and the passage of time, not by
changes in parental affection and responsibility. The change in geog-
raphy must occur before the questionable removable; here, the re-
moval precipitated the change in geography. If we were to determine
that by removing [the child] from his habitual residence without Mr.
Friedrich's knowledge or consent Mrs. Friedrich "altered" [the child's]
habitual residence, we would render -the Convention meaningless. It
would be an open invitation for all parents who abduct their children
to characterize their wrongful removals as alterations of habitual
residence. 160
Therefore, under the Friedrich approach, it appears that a determi-
nation of habitual residence rests upon considerations which pertain
to the settlement of the child in a certain geographic location. Such a
determination should focus upon the actual recent history of the child,
and not on the parent's intentions as to the child's welfare. Moreover,
the geographic locus must be accompanied by a showing that there has
been a significant passage of time so as to enable the child to become
accustomed to and acclimated to the location. While many courts have
looked favorably upon the Friedrich rationale, 161 other courts have
taken a somewhat dissimilar view. The distinction in the courts' ap-
proaches turns on the speed with which habitual residence changes,
with the courts holding contra to Friedrich finding the concept of habit-
ual residence to be readily adaptable.
(G] iving the express [ion] 'habitual [ ] residen [ce]' . .. its ordinary and
natural meaning, such residence of a person in a particular country
... could be lost in a single day by that person leaving the country with
a settled intention not to return, that the habitual residence of a child
would be that of the parent in whose sole custody he was .... It may
take time - I do not say it does - to establish habitual residence, but
157 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
15s Id.
159 Id at 1401-02.
160 Id.
161 See, e.g., Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D. Kan. 1993). See also Dorosin,
supra note 151, at 755-56 (stating that the Friedrich holding represents a "reitera[tion of] the
policies of the Convention" as well as a "triumph of the[se] policy considerations").
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I cannot see that it takes any time to terminate it. James' intentions
must, of course, be those of his mother since he is two and a half,
there is no doubt at all in my mind that the mother ceased to be habit-
ually resident in Western Australia from the moment she left . . .
bound for England with the intent of remaining permanently in this
country.
16 2
Regardless of the view taken by the court, the issue of habitual
residence should always be at the forefront of the petitioner's mind in
a Hague proceeding. The issue often is the controlling factor in the
outcome of the case.165 If the issue of habitual residence is misinter-
preted by the court, the result will not only be a decisive defeat for the
petitioner but it may also represent a defeat for the Convention be-
cause it is a circumvention of its goals.
b. What Are "Custody Rights"?
Having arrived at a determination of the child's habitual resi-
dence, the next step is to determine whether the left behind parent
had a "right of custody". within the ambit of the Convention. Rights
under the Hague Convention are triggered only when there has been a
breach of "rights of custody."1 64 Article 5 of the Convention defines
rights of custody to include "rights relating to the care of the person of
the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of
residence," 6 5 as defined by the laws of the habitual resident State.1 66
This concept must be distinguished from rights of access (visitation
rights) since the remedy afforded the party turns on the distinction. 167
Rights of access "include the right to take a child for a limited period
of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence.' 68
When a child has been removed or retained in breach of rights of
custody, and no exceptions set forth in Article 13 have been estab-
162 Webb & Friedman, supra note 92, at 10 (quoting C. v. S., 3 W.C.R. 492 (1990) (U.K)).
163 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Collopy and Christodoulou, No. 90 DR 1138 (D. Colo.
1991), available in Hilton House BBS, File Collopy.Co. In Collopy, a Greek man and a Colo-
rado woman were married in Colorado but returned to England for educational pursuits. Id.
Shortly after the birth of a child, the wife returned to the United States with the child, to
which the father objected. Id. He then brought a Hague Convention proceeding. Id. Be-
cause the child had been in the United States for longer than a year, the court exercised its
Article 12 discretion not to return the child. Id. However, as to the issue of habitual resi-
dence, the court stated that England was the habitual residence because it was the residence
of the father. Id. This language indicated that the court was reverting back to comparing
habitual residence with domicile. Id.
164 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3.
165 Id. at art. 5(a).
166 The intent of the Convention was to protect those relationships which would have
been protected by the habitual state's laws prior to the child's removal. Prez-Vera Report,
supra note 8, 1 65.
167 Id See also Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991) (party
seeking mandatory return must satisfy the threshold requirement of proving "lawful rights of
custody at the time of the removal or retention").
'68 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5(b).
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lished, 169 the Convention mandates that the nation to which the child
has been taken order the return of the child to its habitual residence
"forthwith."1 70 In contrast, the Convention does not mandate any spe-
cific remedy when a noncustodial parent has established interference
with rights of access. 17 1 Rather, nations are instructed to "promote the
peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfillment of any condi-
tions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject," as well as to
"take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles-to the exercise of
such rights."i 72
In ascertaining whether custody rights exist, three possible1 73
sources should be examined: (1) judicial or administrative decisions;
(2) legally binding agreements between the parties; and (3) operation
of the law of the home state. 1
74
i. Rights by Judicial/Administrative Decision
Custody rights can be found to exist in ajudicial or administrative
decision, established prior to, or even after, the removal.1 7 5 As the
Convention history demonstrates, the decision regarding custody
rights may be that of the state of the habitual residence or one of a
third country. All that is required of the decree is that it "contain in
principle certain minimum characteristics which are necessary for set-
ting in motion the means by which it may be confirmed or recog-
nized"; a formal recognition of the third country's decree is
unnecessary.' 76 However, custody orders which have been rendered
by a court in the child's habitual residence always take precedent over
an order which has been obtained in another jurisdiction if dual or-
ders have been issued.1 77 The decree recognized by the law of the
child's habitual residence is the decree upon which the validity of the
order is to be determined.17 8
169 See infra notes 217-80 and accompanying text.
170 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 12.
171 Id. at art. 21.
172 Id.
173 The word "possible" is purposefully used in this context. The source of "rights of
custody" which may give rise to a Hague petition are intrinsically tied to the determination of
the "habitual residence." See Silberman, supra note 23, at 21. This is because custody rights
are determined by looking towards the law of the home state. Hague Convention, supra note
8, at art. 3(a); see also supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
174 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3 ("The fights of custody mentioned in sub-
paragraph a above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or
administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of
that State.").
175 See, e.g., Grimer v. Grimer, No. 93-4086-DES, 1993 WL 142695, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 14,
1993).
176 Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 69.
177 Cf Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 n.2 (D. Ariz. 1991).
178 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,507 (citing Pirez Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 69):
[T]he court order need not have been made by a court in the State of the
child's habitual residence. It could be one originating from another country.
As the reporter points out, when custody rights were exercised in the State of
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Acquiescence has played a role in some parental abduction cases,
with the courts placing great weight on the fact that a party has acqui-
esced to a jurisdiction other than that of the habitual residence.1 79 If
the parties agree that the law of a certain forum should be utilized in
the custody proceeding, then it is logical to refer to that law as if it
were the law of the habitual residence in determining custody
rights.180 In such cases, the parties' agreement plays a pivotal role in
determining what forum should be used to return the parties to the
status quo for purposes of custody litigation.' 81 In addition, the obvi-
ous rationale for favoring the agreed upon jurisdiction versus the de
facto "habitual residence" is that neither party will be prejudiced or
inconvenienced by mandating the return of the child to that jurisdic-
tion.18 2 However, it is important to note that this principle conflicts
with the commonly held notion, in the United States, that subject mat-
ter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by agreement of the
parties.' 8 3
the child's habitual residence on the basis of a foreign decree, the Convention
does not require that the decree has been formally recognized.
Id.
179 See, e.g., Surtomme v. Surtomme, No. 92-4218-SAC, 1993 WL 105144, at *5 (D. Kan.
1993). For an illustrative example of a court utilizing acquiescence as a basis for determining
which law is to govern, see also Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989). In Sheikh,
after a series of abductions and counterabductions, the mother reopened the divorce pro-
ceedings in New York, and custody was jointly awarded some two years later. Id. at 519. The
mother subsequently moved with the child to England without notifying the father. Id. Two
years later, the father tracked down the child and instituted proceedings in England to which
he did not bring forth the custody decree issued by the New York court. Id. at 519-20. The
father was awarded liberal visitations with the child in the United States, and in one such
period, retained the child in violation of the decree. I. at 520. In a New York proceeding to
determine the "habitual residence," the court noted the following:
The court is faced with a facially valid order of a court from a country which is a
co-signatory of the Convention. Plaintiff [the father] raises the issue, however,
that since the initial custody decree was made in New York and defendant vio-
lated it, the [English] High Court ofJustice's decree is a nullity. He argues that
this court's orders should control.
The problem with this analysis is that plaintiff did not take this court's
order to the High Court of Justice to petition for enforcement under the
Hague Convention.... He thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
foreign court so that it could make a de novo custody award in part based upon
defendant's actions in New York .... [P]laintiff cannot now come back to this
court to ask it to ignore the custody/visitation decision and order of a court of
a Hague Convention cosignatory ....
Id.
180 See Duquette v. Tahan, 600 A.2d 472, 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
181 Recall that one of the underlying purposes of the Hague Convention was to return
the parties to the status quo before the removal. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying
text.
182 What the Convention seeks to avoid is disadvantaging one parent, either economi-
cally, physically, or legally, by requiring them to litigate in an adverse forum which was ob-
tained through wrongful removal and is not the habitual residence. See Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993) ([T]he Hague Convention was aimed: [at]
situations where one parent attempts to settle a difficult family situation, and obtain an ad-
vantage in any possible future custody struggle, by returning to the parent's native country
183 See, e.g., Evicks v. Evicks, 607 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("It is axio-
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ii. Rights by Parties'Agreement
Agreements about custody which have legal effect in the state of
habitual residence also form a source of custody rights under the Con-
vention.1 8 4 The legal effect of such agreements arise from the internal
law of the state of habitual residence or its choice of law rules.1 85 The
parties' agreements, in and of themselves, however, are not required to
carry the force of law to confer custody rights on a party (i.e., such
agreements need not be incorporated into a court decree or judg-
ment).1 8 6 Legally recognizable agreements may in fact exist outside
Contracting States' judicial framework.' 87
iii. Rights by Operation of Law
Absent an agreement or formal custody order, custody rights may
also arise by operation of law. Thus, a party may be afforded the pro-
tections of the Convention by virtue of interpreting the law of the
child's habitual residence as conferring on the party a right of cus-
tody. 188 The Convention seems to assume that such pre-decree rights
exist in both parents, at least where the parties are married. 189 How-
ever, in order to determine if rights arise under the operation of law, a
careful analysis of the habitual residence country's law may be re-
quired. Where the court is in doubt as to whether rights of custody are
granted, under Article 15 of the Convention a decision or other deter-
mination of a breach of custody rights may be obtained from the state
of habitual residence. 190 On the other hand, if no doubts exist, Article
14 empowers the trial court to recognize the law of the Contracting
States without mandating that the cumbersome requirements of judi-
cial notice be observed.19 1
matic that subject matter jurisdiction may not be conferred upon a court by agreement of the
parties, and may not be waived, and that the lack thereof is a basis for mandatory sua sponte
dismissal.").
184 For an examination of a case finding custody rights based upon agreements between
the parties, see David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (Fain. Ct. 1991).
185 Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 70.
186 Id.
187 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,507.
188 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 3(b); Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,506
("Thus, a person whose child is abducted prior to the entry of a custody order is not required
to obtain a custody order in the State of the child's habitual residence as a prerequisite to
invoking the Convention's return provisions."). Also, see supra notes 69-74 and accompany-
ing text (distinguishing the Hague Convention from other child custody jurisdiction acts).
189 Several courts' interpretations of the Convention bear out this assumption. See, e.g.,
Dickson v. Dickson, 1990 S.C.L.R. 692 (Sess. 1990) (Scot.), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Scocas File (Australian parents share joint custody of child under age of eighteen); In re
RPW, No. 106SP (High Court Feb. 19, 1992), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Irecas File
(under English law, parents share joint parental responsibility over minor child).
190 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 15.
191 IM at art. 14.
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c. Are Custody Rights Actually Exercised?
To invoke the Convention, not only must the holder of custody
rights establish that the rights in fact exist but that party must also
allege that the custody rights were actually beingexercised or would
have been had it not been for the wrongful removal or retention. 192
The most prevalent fact pattern arises where a parent who has had the
primary parenting role accedes to a request to allow the child to visit
the noncustodial parent.193 The child is given to the parent generally
with the explicit or implicit promise of return.1 94. At the conclusion of
the visitation period 'the child is retained in the foreign jurisdiction.
Faced with such a scenario, the courts must ultimately determine
whether the removal of the child was an exercise of custodial rights or
a relinquishment of them. Courts, however, generally are reluctant to
find an abandonment of custody rights by the custodial parent in cases
such as this.195
Embodied within the concept of actual exercise of custody rights
is the principle that the party is controlling the residence of the
child.' 96 As such, the party claiming that they are exercising custody
rights is also deemed to have declared the child's abode to correspond
with their own. A parent may place a child in another's care for short
periods of time and still be considered to be exercising custodial
rights.' 97 This fact is further exemplified by the Convention itself
which is "built upon the tacit presumption" that the person who has
custody rights was actually exercising that custody.198 In so holding,
the Convention places the burden of proof on the abductor if he
wishes to prevent the return of the child.1 99
Correspondingly, very little is required of the applicant to 'support
an allegation that custody rights were actually being exercised prior to
the abduction.200 The pleadings and proof requirements are informal
192 Id. at art. 3(b).
193 See, e.g., Mazerolle v. Mazerolle, No. 30-85-06, 1992 WL 155458, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 29, 1992); Renovales v. Roosa, No. FA-91-0392232S, 1991 WL 204483, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991).
194 See, e.g., Tyszka v. Tyszka, 503 N.W.2d 726, 727 (Mich. App. 1993); Renovates, 1991 WL
204483, at *1.
195 Cf Friedrich ',. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). The court in Friedrich stated
that a finding of abandonment would be unlikely even under circumstances in which the
father ordered the mother and son from their family home. Id. at 1402.
196 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5 (" 'rights of custody' shall include rights
relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the
child's place of residence").
197 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,506.
198 William M. Hilton, Dreaming the Impossible Dream: Responding to a Petition Under the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Done at the Hague on 25 Oct. 1980,
in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How TO HANDLE IN-
TERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 10 (Sept. 30, 1993). See also Legal Analysis, supra note
14, at 10,507.
199 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13; Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 73.
200 Pfrez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 73 (only preliminary evidence is required).
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in nature and require little more than a statement as to "the grounds
on which the applicant's claim" rests. 201
2. The Child Is Under the Age of 16
A second requirement for the Convention to be applicable con-
cerns the age of the child. This requirement, found in Article 4 pro-
vides that: "The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains
the age of 16 years-old."20 2 The rationale behind the age requirement
is that "a person of more than sixteen years of age generally has a mind
of his own which cannot easily be ignored either by one or both of his
parents, or by ajudicial or administrative authority."203 The choice of
this age limit also reflects the determination of the drafters to provide
the Convention with an internal consistency between provisions:
[T] he decision taken in this regard cannot be isolated from the provi-
sion in [A]rticle 13, second paragraph, which allows the competent au-
thorities to have regard to the opinion of the child as to its return,
once it has reached an appropriate age and maturity. Indeed, this
rule leaves it open to judicial or administrative authorities, whenever
they are faced with the possibility of returning a minor legally entitled
to decide on his place of residence to take the view that the opinion of
the child should always be a decisive factor.20 4
Because the Convention sets forth a bright-line rule, the interpre-
tation of the 16-year age limit has not produced particular difficul-
ties.20 5 Even so, the provision has met with some resistance. During
the drafting of the Convention, the United States objected to this arti-
cle and put forth the following alternative-"that the Convention
cover any child who was under 16 at the time of the breach of custody
or access rights." 20 6 The proposal was considered necessary by the
United States because "it fear[ed] that abductors could take advantage
of the article by using various delaying tactics both before and during
judicial or administrative proceedings."2 0 7 In the end, nevertheless,
the Convention adopted the more restrictive approach. 20
8
3. The Convention Is in Effect Between the Home and Haven
State
The final element that must be established in order to state a
prima facie case is that the Convention is in force between two Con-
tracting States. To be binding, the Convention must have been ratified
between the country of the child's habitual residence and the country
201 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 8(c).
202 Id. at art. 4.
203 Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 77.
204 1d
205 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
206 Silberman, supra note 23, at 54.
207 Id. at 54-55.
208 Id. at 55 (citing Parez Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 77).
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to which the child has been abducted at the time of the abduction.20 9
This requirement is formulated in Article 35 of the Convention which
postulates that only those "wrongful removals or retentions occurring
after its entry into force" in the Contracting State will fall within the
auspices of the treaty.210 Some contention has been raised as to the
issue of retroactivity, as some applicants have argued that a wrongful
retention is a "continuing offense" such that an order for return could
still be granted: once the Convention became effective between Con-
tracting States.211 The case law on this point makes it explicit that such
a contention will not prevail. The leading case on point is Kilgour v.
Kilgour.212 In Kilgour, the Scottish court rejected a "continuing of-
fense" claim of retroactivity. The court believed that the Convention's
likely intent was to mandate that removals or retentions should occur
on a specific date so that an effective date of the treaty could be mea-
sured.213 In addition, the Kilgour Court noted that it made no differ-
ence that a permanent decree had been issued after the effective date
because the transition from an interim to a permanent decree should
not create a new retention. 214 Since Kilgour, the door to a retroactive
claim has been closed. 215 However, it should be noted that retroactiv-
209 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 38. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at
10,501 (other countries may accede); supra note 8 (listing the ratifying and acceding
countries).
210 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 35; Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 144.
211 The United Kingdom has proposed that "since it envisaged the Convention applying
to all 'abductions,' irrespective of when it [the Convention] came into effect[,]" then retroac-
tivity should be allowed. Parez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 144 (describing the various propos-
als in regard to the scope of the Convention and the ultimate rejection of the' British
proposal).
212 1987 Sess. Cas. 55 (1986) (Scot.).
213 Id. at 61-62. In Kilgour, the Convention had been entered into force between the
United Kingdom and Ontario on August 1, 1986. Id. at 56. However, the mother had ab-
ducted the child in January 1986, taking him from Canada to Scotland, prior to the Conven-
tion's effective date. Id.
214 Id. Accord In re S, 3 All E.R. 230, 239-41 (H.L. 1991) (U.K.):
The period of one year referred to in this article is a period measured from the
date of the wrongful removal or retention. That appears to me to show clearly
that, for the purposes of the convention, both removal and retention are events
occuring on a specific occasion, for otherwise it would be impossible to mea-
sure a period of one year from their occurrence. It was submitted ... that, in
case of retention, the date from which the period of one year was to be mea-
sured was the date of inception of the retention and that, if art[.] 12 was inter-
preted in that way, it was not inconsistent with retention being a continuing
state of affairs. I find myself unable to accept that submission. To interpret
art[.] 12 in that way involves inserting into it words which are not there and, if
intended to apply, could readily have been put in.
Id. at 239-40.
215 See also Gollogly v. Owen, No. T2823 (Austl. Fam. Ct. Oct. 5, 1989), available in Hilton
House BBS, File Owen.Aus [hereinafter Gollogly]. In Gollogly, the Australian court struck
down a retroactive claim that was based on a different rationale than that of Kilgour. Id.; see
also supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. In Go//ogly, the children had been taken from
Alaska and brought to Australia prior to the effective date of the Convention in the United
States. Gollogly, supra. After the Convention became effective, however, the Alaskan court
granted the father custody. Id. The father argued that the retention of the children in Aus-
tralia by the mother became wrongful after the Alaskan court rendered its court order. Id.
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ity may apply if an agreement is achieved among the Contracting Par-
ties themselves. 216
C. Grounds for Opposing the Return of the Child
Where a child under the age of 16 has been wrongfully removed
or retained, and a Hague Convention proceeding is brought within a
year, the duty of. the judicial authority of a Contracting State to order
the immediate return of a wrongfully retained child is mandated
under Article 12 of the Convention. 21' However, the Convention also
grants certain exceptions to this duty. Articles 12,218 13,219 and 20220
of the Convention set forth the defenses available in a Hague proceed-
ing. Such defenses include alleging that:
- The child objects to being returned and is of an appropriate age
and maturity to make such a determination; 22 1
- The child is settled in his new environment;2 2 2
- The custodial parent has consented or acquiesced in the removal
or retention of the child;
223
- There is a grave risk that return would expose the child to harm or
an intolerable situation; 224
- Return of the child is not permitted "by the fundamental princi-
ples of the requested state relating to the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms"; 225
- The child's legal custodian has failed to exercise his or her rights
of custody.
2 2 6
"These exceptions permit the court to exercise its discretion as to
The Australian court did not agree and held that wrongful retention existed where there was
breach of custody rights under the law of the habitual residence. Id. Based on this, the court
went on to conclude that Australia, not Alaska, constituted the "habitual residence" of the
children, since it was their settled environment. Id.
216 PNrez-Vera Rport, supra note 8, 145. Elisa Prez-Vera commented on Article 35 as
follows:
The provision [Article 35] certainly has the merit of being clear. However, it
cannot be denied that its application is fated to frustrate the legitimate expecta-
tions of the individuals concerned. But since in the last resort it is a limitation
on the duty to return the child, it in no way prevents two or more States agree-
ing amongst themselves to derogate from it in terms of [A] rticle 36, by agreeing
to apply the Convention retroactively.
Id.
217 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
218 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 12.
219 Id. at art. 13.
220 Id. at art. 20.
221 Id. at art. 13. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
222 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 12. See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying
text.
223 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(a). See infra notes 247-54 and accompany-
ing text.
224 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(b). See infra notes 255-74 and accompany-
ing text.
225 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 20. See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying
text.
226 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(a). This topic has been dealt with previ-
ously in this Comment. For a discussion, see supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
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whether or not the child should be returned .... [Exceptions under
these articles do] not mandate that the court shall not order the return of
that child, but that the court may not order the return."227 However, it
should always be kept in mind that these exceptions are to be narrowly
construed so as to give effect to the Convention's aim under Article
19.228
1. Objection by the Child to Being Returned
The first exception to mandatory return allows for the administra-
tive and judicial authorities to consider the child's wishes when deter-
mining whether to return the child. Under the second paragraph in
Article 13(b), the court may refuse to order return "if it finds that the
child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of [his or her]
views." 229 The courts in interpreting this defense generally require evi-
dence which demonstrates more than just a child's preference to re-
main with the abducting parent.230 The word 'objects' the courts
conclude must amount to more than just a mere preference; it must
take the form of a strong objection. 23 1 Furthermore, the judicial au-
thorities have held that consideration must be given to the particular
facts of each case to determine whether the child is. in fact expressing
an objection that has arisen out of his or her own free will or whether
the objection has been influenced by other parties.23 2 In evaluating
this determination, the courts have concluded that if the child's view
has been influenced by the abducting parent, or the objection to re-
turn was based on a wish to remain with the abducting parent, then
227 Hilton, supra note 198, at 7.
228 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 19 ("A decision under this Convention con-
cerning the return of that child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any
custody issue."). See also Silberman, supra note 23, at 37:
Perhaps the most important aspect for [the] success of the Convention will be
the ability to limit the use of defenses. If the Convention procedures result in
return of the child for a custody determination, parties will be encouraged to
invoke them. But, if certain Contracting States invoke the defenses to avoid
return, the return mechanism will be thwarted. International cooperation will
be frustrated, and parties will once again resort to self-help.
Id.
229 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(b). This discretionary authority, or excep-
tion, of the Convention is closely related to the age limit requirement contained in Article 4.
At one point in the Convention's drafting it was thought that the Convention should be held
inapplicable in cases of children under 16 who, under the laws of their state, were entitled to
choose their own residence. See Pre-Vera Report supra note 8, 78. However, given this
exception under Article 13(b)-to consider the child's wishes-the drafters chose not to
make the Convention inapplicable in such situations since the same result could be achieved
without an overall reduction in the scope of the Convention. Id.
230 See, e.g., In reR, [1992] 21 Fain. Law 475, 475 (1991) (Eng. Fain. Ct.) ("[T]here must
be more than a mere preference expressed by the child [and] [t]he word 'objects' imports a
strength of feeling which goes far beyond the usual ascertainment of the wishes of the child
in a custody dispute.").
231 1I
232 Id.
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little or no weight should be given to the request. 233
Additionally, for the exception to apply, the court must find that
the child has reached such an age and degree of maturity so that his or
her views should be considered in the process.23 4 The Convention,
however, does not set forth an age at which the child's wishes must be
considered by the court. Furthermore, some courts and commenta-
tors have suggested that such a threshold should not be, either for-
mally or informally, established. 23 5 However, case law does provide
some guidance on this point. For example, in Bickerton v. Bickerton,236
the Superior Court of California concluded that neither a 10 year-old
boy nor the 12 year-old girl were of sufficient age and maturity for the
court to take account of their request.23 7 This view is further shared by
other cases which have held that 9 and 11 year-old children are of in-
sufficient age.23 8 However, it should be noted that several, cases have
refused to return the child, even though the child has expressed an
objection, and thus allowed the exception to stand, involving 11, 12,
and 13 year-old children. 23 9
2. The Child Has Settled in a New Environment (One Year
Elapse)
Article 12 provides that if a Hague proceeding has been com-
menced after the expiration of one year, the return of the child is dis-
cretionary "unless it is demonstrated- that the child is now settled in its
new environment."240 The rationale behind this "new environment/
lapse of time" exception is rooted within the Convention itself. The
233 In reS, [19931 Fam. 242, 252 (1992) (Eng.). See also Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at
10,510.
234 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art..13(b).
235 See, e.g., In reS, [1993] Fam. at 251.
236 No. 91-06694 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1991), available in Hilton House BBS, 'File Bicker.Ca.
237 Id
238 See, e.g., Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521-22 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (child, who is 9
years old, has not obtained an age and degree of maturity to warrant the court to make the
child's view dispositive); Tahan v. Duquette, 19 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1003 (1992) (9 year-old
child is of insufficient age and maturity). See also Silberman, supra note 23, at 56 (recounting
Rajarantnam v. Rajarantnam-Hertig, where the Swiss lower court refused to return children,
who had expressed an objection, ages 14 and 12).
239 VAN BUEREN, supra note 65, at 19. Cf. In reJohn Arthur Urness, 1993 Outer House
Cas. (Oct. 28, 1993) (Scot.), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Scocas File. In Urness, the
court stated that a 12 year-old, but not a 9 year-old, child is of a sufficient age and maturity to
object to return. The Scottish court, however,, went on to deny the return of both children
on the grounds that the separation, of the siblings would create an "intolerable situation"
under art. 13(b) of the Convention. On appeal, the decision was upheld by an Inner House
panel which noted that the "special circumstances" of the case justify the lower court's intol-
erable situation analysis. Urness v. Urness, 1993 Inner House Cas. (Dec. 17, 1993) (Scot.),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Scocas File.
240 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art: 12. For an analysis of the approach taken by
the courts in determining whether a child has settled into the new environs, see Perrin v.
Perrin, 1993 S.C.L.R. 949 (Scot. Sess.), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Scocas File ("[Tihe
crucial factor in determining settlement in the new environment [is] not the length of time
which C ha[s] spent in Scotland but how long she ha[s] lived in her new home....").
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Hague Convention operates on the basis that it is in the best interest of
the child to be returned to that jurisdiction with a minimum delay and
thus emphasizes the immediate restoration of the status quo. It is pre-
sumed that if the child remains too long in a new residence, the child
will undergo another major uprooting if he or she is returned.241
Therefore, arguably, the exception seems to be justified under the am-
bit and spirit of the Convention.
The time limits and discretion addressed in the Article 12 excep-
tion have been hotly debated and arose solely as the product of treaty
compromise. 242 Proposed early drafts of the Convention varied greatly
regarding the specific time frame within which a Hague proceeding
should be commenced in order to effectuate mandatory return.2 43
Likewise, the United States vehemently expressed its deep concern
throughout the Convention process about the one-year time limit be-
cause they feared that such a provision might encourage some parents
"to arrange for life underground for a limited period in order to cir-
cumvent the Convention."244 However, in the final version of the Con-
vention, the apprehension over further psychological and emotional
problems that might be imposed on an abducted child prevailed as the
delegates instituted the one-year/new environment exception.2 45 In
hindsight, these contentions and concerns surrounding Article 12 may
not have been justified because of the sparsity of case law on this
point.246
3. Acquiescence in the Removal/Retention
If a party consented or subsequently acquiesced to the other par-
ent's removal or retention of the child, the Court is not bound to or-
der the return of the child. 24 7 Thus, the effect of this provision is that
241 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
242 This debate existed not only in the drafting phase, see infta notes 243-45 and text
accompanying, but has also been carried over in the literature. See Monica M. Copertino,
Comment, Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: An Analysis of
its Efficacy, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 715, 729-31 (1991).
243 Silberman, supra note 23, at 58.
244 Id.
245 Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 108 (The P're-Vera Report indicates that the single-
time limit was preferable in order to decrease confusion.).
246 See e.g., David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Fam. Ct. 1991). In David S., the
mother, after having been served to appear in court, left the Toronto area in violation of a
separation agreement limiting visitation. Id. at 431. The Supreme Court of Ontario held the
mother in contempt and awarded temporary custody to the father. Id. The father, over the
course of the next year, was unsure of the children's whereabouts. After the one year time
frame had passed, a Hague application was filed by the father. The court, however, relying
on the mother's prior abduction and seclusion of the children, held that"[u]nder the[se]
circumstances ... this Court does not find the petitioner's proceeding to return the children
was untimely...." Id. at 433. For additional discussion on the case law interpretation of the
.settled into a new environment" exception, see Bruch, supra note 8, at 13-15; Neault, supra
note 129, at 18-22.
247 This ground for opposing return of the child is found in Article 13, paragraph (a),
which states:
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the consent or acquiescence acts as a catharsis which makes the initial
abduction "lose its wrongful character."248 Hence, return of the child
to the state of habitual residence, under these circumstances should
not be a mandated duty of the judicial or administrative authority.2 49
"Most courts, which have addressed the issue of acquiescence, be-
cause of their wish to discourage loopholes in the Convention, have
been very reluctant to find it, even where there has been ambiguous
behavior by the parent who was left behind."250 Many commentators,
and judging from their reluctance, perhaps the courts, feel that by
broadly construing acquiescence in an array of circumstances, the Con-
vention may in fact be undermined because a large amount of discre-
tion would be placed in the hands of the judicial authorities.2 5 1
Abductors would then have at their fingertips a tool by which they
could "exploit judicial discretion" and ultimately, use it to turn the
summary nature of the Hague Convention's proceedings into a discus-
sion of the merits. 25 2 While this fear may be warranted, the courts
have yet to place themselves in this position because the claims of the
other parent's acquiescence have generally fallen on deaf ears. 25 3 This
trend is illustrated most readily in the recent. overturning of several
lower court opinions in France which had "liberally" interpreted
acquiescence. 254
4. Grave Risk of Harm
The most commonly raised defense under the Convention is
found in Article 13(b). 255 Article 13(b) authorizes, but does not re-
quire, a court to return an abducted child if "there is a grave risk that
the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child
was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or reten-
tion, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or
retention[.J
Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(a).
The courts, in determining whether a parent has acquiesced to the child's removal, have
tended to look at both the subjective and objective circumstances surrounding the particular
case. See, e.g., In re S. 1 F.L.R. 819 (Eng. C.A. 1994), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, UK-
Case File. However, the courts have attempted to not place "undue emphasis" on this subjec-
tive portion of their analysis. I&
248 Neault, supra note 129, at 23.
249 Id
250 Bruch, sura note 8, at 8.
251 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 12, at 452.
252 1&
253 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
254 For a discussion of the case, see Silberman, supra note 23, at 37. Also, for a thorough
discussion of the case law in the area, see generally, id. at 37-41. In addition, for a U.S. case
on the issue, see Becker v. Becker, No. FD-14-14-90, 1989 N.J. Super. LEXIS 538 (App. Div.
Aug. 28, 1989).
255 Bruch, supra note 8, at 9. The abundance of litigation that has resulted from this
provision of the Convention has been suggested to arise because "it is the one that comes
closest to allowing the court in the haven country to examine the merits of the case."
LeGette, supra note 68, at 297.
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his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." 256 The
13(b) exception arose out of the necessity to provide the courts some
discretion from the realities of ordering a child to return to the state of
habitual residence. Even in some cases of wrongful removal or reten-
tion, the ordering of a return could be more disastrous to the child
than the consequences of allowing the foreign jurisdiction to decide
the case. 2 5 7
In defining the exception, the Convention's drafters intended
that 13(b) be construed narrowly by the judicial authorities. 258 The
drafters were adamant that this defense would not give rise to an exam-
ination of the abducted child's "best interests."259 The exception was
to be raised only where it had been established "that the child itself,
and not the abductor, would be placed in an intolerable situation."2 60
The risk of harm was to exceed the level of triviality and constitute an
"intolerable situation" that is of an extreme and compelling nature.2 61
"Proof of a high degree of risk of positive harm is therefore re-
quired; not just proof that it would be better for the child if he were
not returned." 26 2 Hence, the mere fact that a financial or educational
disadvantage is created by the mandate of the child's return does not
amount to an intolerable harm. 2 63 Instead, the courts have generally
required a much stronger showing of harm in order to narrowly tailor
the 13(b) exception.264 In fact, in only one instance-MacMillan v.
256 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 13(b).
257 LeGette, supra note 68, at 297. See also Pirez-Vera Report, supra note 8, 1 29:
Thus, the interest of the child in not being removed from its habitual residence
without sufficient guarantees of its stability in the new environment, gives way
before the primary interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or
psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable situation.
Id.
258 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,509-10,510. See also Prez-Vera Report, supra note 8,
1 34:
[1]t would seem necessary to underline the fact that the three types of excep-
tions to the rule concerning the return of the child must be applied only so far
as they go and no further. This applies above all that they are to be interpreted
in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become dead letter. In fact,
the Convention as a whole rests upon the unanimous rejection of this phenom-
enon of illegal child removals and upon the conviction that the best way to
combat them at an international level is to refuse to grant them recognition.
Id.
259 Legal Analysis, supra note 14, at 10,510.
260 Anton, supra note 27, at 551.
261 In re N, [1991] 21 Fain. Law 367, 368 (1990) (Eng. Fain.).
262 Neault, supra note 129, at 25 (quoting Ruth Lavery, Child Abduction and the Law of
Custody, 38 N. IR. L.Q. 170, 176 (1987)).
263 LeGette, supra note 68, at 297-98.
264 For a general discussion of the case law through 1989, see id. at 298-308. See also In re
E, [1989] 19 Fain. Law 105, 106 (1988) (Eng. C.A.):
If the submissions made on, behalf of the father had been accepted, the effect
would have been to drive a coach and horses through the provisions of this
Convention, since it would be open to any abducting parent to raise allegations
under [A]rticle 13 and then to use those allegations as a tactic for delaying the
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MacMillan265 -has a court found the evidence to be persuasive
enough to deny the return of the child. In MacMillan, a mother ab-
ducted her daughter from her father in Canada and brought her to
Scotland. The Scottish court found that there was a grave risk of harm
posed by the father's alcoholism and depression and denied the fa-
ther's request for the return of his daughter.
266
In determining whether a grave risk of harm situation exists,
courts have emphasized not only the degree of requisite harm but have
also placed a significant emphasis on the source of the harm.26 7 In
order to determine whether facts of a particular case present a grave
risk of harm, the court is first faced with the question of whether the
harm is posed by the country to which the child is to be returned, or
alternatively, if the risk is created by mandating that the child be re-
turned to the non-abducting parent. The rationale behind this distinc-
tion centers on the fact that if the risk is posed by the parent, then the
issue is really no different than a general custody case.
268
a. Risk Posed by the Country
The most narrow view in which courts have construed the 13(b)
exception is by framing the question in terms of whether the child's
return to the other country-not the other parent-will pose a "grave
risk" of harm to the child.2 69 In practical terms, therefore, there would
only exist a few situations that would suggest that a child will be in
danger if returned to the requesting (habitual resident) state. For in-
stance, "a grave risk would be posed by the country if the habitual resi-
dent country was at war on its soil" or if the country was experiencing
the aftermath of a nuclear or natural disaster.270 However, besides
searching at the extremes, return would almost always be assured.
hearing by saying that oral evidence must be heard, information must be ob-
tained .... That is precisely what the Convention ... [was] intended to avoid.
Id.
265 1989 S.L.T. 350 (Scot. Ex. Div.).
266 Id. at 354.
267 See Gsponer v. Johnstone, 12 Fam. L.R. 755 (Austl. Fam. 1988), available in Hilton
House BBS, File Gsponer.Aus ("[The 13(b) exception] is confined to the "grave risk" of harm
to the child arising from his or her return to a country .... Thus, allegations about inappro-
priate conduct on the part of the parent in the requesting state are irrelevant.").
268 Arenstein, supra note 82, at 23 n.104.
269 See supra note 267 and accompanying text. For a criticism of this approach, see Sil-
berman, supra note 23, at 49-50:
This interpretation, though helpful in limiting the scope of 13(b), does not
appear to be consistent with 13(b)'s focus on "conduct of the parties and the
interests of the child." Moreover, such interpretation appears redundant in
light of the Article 20 exception, which excepts return when return is inconsis-
tent with fundamental principles of the requested State relating to protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus, Article 20-but not
13(b)-is directed to concerns about harms arising from the child's return to a
particular country.
Id.
270 Webb & Friedman, supra note 92, at 16.
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b. Risk Posed by the Parent
Even where the court interprets "grave risk" as risk posed by the
parent, the burden is a "very heavy burden" for the abducting parent
to fall within the ambit of Article 13.271 The case law demonstrates
that the abductor has to prove more than the simple assertion that the
other parent is merely an unfit parent because issues of parental fitness
are appropriate 0nly for the state of habitual residence. 2 72 Instead, the
courts have attempted to advance the Convention's goals through
their interpretation of the exception by requiring "substantial" physical
or psychological harm.2 73 Furthermore, the case law has made it clear
that while it is not the court's place to penalize the abducting parent,
because it is not a criminal proceeding, they will not allow the abduct-
ing parent to reap any benefits from a situation they have created.
2 74
5. Return Endangers Human Rights
The final exception, provided under Article 20, allows for the
court to refuse to order the return of the child "if this would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relat-
ing to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms."27 5
This provision was adopted as a compromise measure to resolve a de-
bate among the drafters of the Convention concerning the role of
"public policy" concerns. An alternative reservation had been sug-
gested during the Convention's framing which would have permitted
the Contracting States to deny the return of the child to the state of
habitual residence when it was deemed "manifestly incompatible with
the fundamental principles of the law relating to family" issues. 276 The
proposal was rejected, however, and the current provision was enacted
271 SeeIn re E, [1989] 19 Fam. Law 105, 106 (1988) (Eng. C.A.).
272 See, e.g., MacMillan v. MacMillan, 1989 S.L.T. 350 (Scot. Ex. Div.).
273 See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text. The 13(b) exception has received the
attention of many commentators since the passage of the Convention. An extensive analysis
of the case law on this point has been expertly exhausted and thus will not be re-examined in
this Comment. For a thorough discussion of the cases, see LeGette, supra note 68, at 298-304
(discussing cases through 1989) and Silberman, supra note 23, at 41-50 (discussing cases
through September of 1993).
274 See, e.g., C v. C, [1989] 2 All E.R. 465 (Eng. C.A. 1988). In C v. C, the mother wrong-
fully took her child from Australia to England and then claimed that the child would be
psychologically harmed if the child was forced to return alone to Australia. Id. at 466. The
mother claimed that she was unable to accompany the child because of her financial situa-
tion. Id. at 470. The court, in rejecting the mother's claim, stated that a parent could not
rely on the psychological harm that results from her own refusal to return with the child. Id.
at 471. The court, however, conditioned the return of the child on the father's promise to
financially support both the mother and child while they were in Australia for the purposes
of determining custody. Id. See also Navarro v. Bullock, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1576, 1577
(1989) ("To retain the children in the United States guarantees that the mother will con-
tinue to frustrate the custodial and visitation rights of the father .... To allow this to happen
would be to allow [the] mother to profit from her wrongdoing.. ").
275 Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 20. At this point, neither the United King-
dom nor Finland are a party to this exception. See VA BUEREN, supra note 65, at 19.
276 Piret-Vera Report, supra note 8, 31-32.
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because the drafters felt that a "public policy" exception per se might
well have undermined the efficacy of the Convention. 277 Under the
current wording of Article 20, a limitation is placed on the role of the
state of refuge since only matters of "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" will qualify for the exception.
In determining matters of "human rights and fundamental free-
doms," Article 20 "is not concerned with international human rights
treaties per se but only if they have been incorporated in such a way as
to amount to fundamental provisions of the requested state."278 The
types of rights and freedoms that fall within the ambit of this excep-
tion, however, are presently undefined since there has been no case
law to date on this provision. 279 The test of Article 20 in the courts,
thus, must come at a later date.280
IV. Problems Remaining Under the Convention & Some Suggested
Solutions
A. Broader Adoption of the Convention
The effectiveness of the Convention hinges upon its acceptance
and ratification in a large number of countries.281 While at its present
state it is a positive step forward in the protection of children from
abduction by parents-with only 35 ratifying or acceding coun-
tries- 28 2 a great portion of the globe is still not bound by the Conven-
tion's provisions. 283 The large number of non-Hague countries
provides abductors with an attractive haven and undermines its deter-
rent effect. Due to the large number of western nations which have
already ratified, 284 it remains especially important to encourage a di-
versified cross-section of the world to join the Convention. 28 5 Tools of
277 1d. 33.
278 VAN BUEREN, supra note 65, at 19.
279 1&
280 It has been suggested by at least one commentator that perhaps this test will be
played out in the country which was once Yugoslavia. However, this hypothetical suggestion
is only valid if Yugoslavia's ratification of the Convention is still in effect and is applicable to
the newly formed states. See Arenstein, supra note 82, at 25.
281 Silberman, supra note 23, at 89-90.
282 See supra note 8.
283 The non-Hague countries, by region of the world, are: (i) in Asia, all countries except
Israel; (ii) in Africa, all countries except Burkino Faso and Mauritius; (iii) in Eastern Europe,
all countries except Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Croatia; (iv) in Western Europe,
Belgium (awaiting ratification), Italy (awaiting ratification), Finland, Liechtenstein, and
Malta are nonsignatories; (v) in North America, there are no nonsignatories; (vi) in South
America, all countries except Argentina and Ecuador; and (vii) in the Caribbean, all coun-
tries except Belize. See Dyer Rema,*s, supra note 17, at 7-9.
284 See supra note 8.
285 In 1986, only 92 of the 276 abductions from the United States ended up in Europe
and Canada, where the overwhelming number of treaty signatories are located. Helzick,
supra note 43, at 120. But see Silberman, supra note 23, at 89 ("[A]n abducting parent does
not usually just seek a safe haven, but often returns to his or her 'home country' where there
is family or other support system [s].").
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persuasion, which could be used to encourage adoption, include sell-
ing the reasons for wide acceptance of the Convention: "its jurisdic-
tion structure [which does not allow the court to reach the issue of
merits], its goal of transcultural objectivity, and its sensitivity to na-
tional and judicial sovereignty." 28 6 Another possibility would be to use
economic or political coaxing to obtain signatories.28 7 Either way, this
situation must be eliminated so that a consistent and uniform system
for the return of children abducted abroad will be established.
B. An Education of the General Legal Community
Inherent in the philosophical underpinnings of the Convention is
the notion that strict application and interpretation of the Conven-
tion's provisions is paramount to deterring future abductions. 288 Fail-
ure of the courts to acquire consistent interpretations would not only
undermine the Convention's deterrent value 28 9 but could also allow
the Convention to become subject to varying national approaches
which would hinder the attainment of its core objectives. 290 It is im-
perative that both the judiciary291 and family law practitioners2 92 be-
286 Silberman, supra note 23, at 90.
287 Brenda J. Shirman, International Treatment of Child Abduction and the 1980 Hague Con-
vention, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 188, 217 (1991). Economic coercion could take the
form of either corporate influence in nations in which the foreign business is operating or
foreign aid prerequisites. Id. Political persuasion could result from nations, such as the
United States, refusal to recognize foreign decrees. Id. Another commentator has suggested
the use of diplomatic coercion. See Caroline Milburn, THE AGE (MELBOURNE),June 1, 1994,
at I (referring to a speech by Chief Justice Alastair Nicholson, Family Court of Australia).
288 Silberman, supra note 23, at 7:
Failure to acquire consistent interpretation of the treaty would undermine its
value as a vehicle for the return of children wrongfully removed or retained in
the international setting. It is in this sense that the Hague Conference,
through its coordination with various (Clontracting [S]tates and the institution
of a Central Authority in each Contracting State, has been pivotal in achieving
effectiveness of the treaty.
Id.
289 l
290 Id. at 77:
Implicit in this stated objective is a desire to avoid self-interested or advanta-
geous resolutions by authorities in a country to which the parent took the
child. While the primary rationale of the Treaty is its two-pronged, interrelated
goal of deterring abductions and directing adjudication of the merits of cus-
tody issues to the state of the child's habitual residence, the quest for standard-
ized application on the return issues is a prerequisite to the fulfillment of these
objectives. If Convention cases became subject to national approaches or per-
spectives, neither of the core objectives of the treaty would be attainable.
Id.
291 The state courts and federal district court benches are responsible for the handling
of Hague cases within the United States. ICARA, supra note 9, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) ("The
courts of the States and the United States district courts shall have concurrent original juris-
diction of actions arising under the Convention."). The states must therefore understand
that the Convention's tenets extend into its domain. Garbolino, supra note 21, at 28.
292 This is required so that the practitioner can fully and adequately advise his client as
well as avoid a malpractice claim. Several malpractice claims in the last few years have been
threatened, but not filed, over the failure to advise a client of the existence of the Hague
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come familiar with this "particularized litigation" and exhibit a firm
grasp on the "intricacies of the Convention" and its ever mounting
case law.29 3
Education of those who are likely to confront a Hague situation
can take many forms. Courses in family law can incorporate lectures
on the Hague Convention to provide future practitioners with at least
the knowledge of its existence. 294 National programs can be set up to
provide comprehensive programs for judges and practitioners. 295 The
state and national American Bar Associations, and their Family Law
Sections, can provide continuing legal education seminars.296 An-
other option would be for the U.S. Central Authority to undertake
some sort of educational endeavor.
A further complicating factor in the education of the judiciary,
who presides over Hague proceedings, is the fact that cases are heard
at the district level. 297 Judges at this level are generalists and may not
either know of the Convention's existence or understand its intrica-
cies. 298 To alleviate this problem, it would be feasible to create "spe-
cialists" within each district by designating specific judges to preside
over this type of specialized litigation when it arises. 299 Education of
the Convention's provisions and case law would then be required to be
grasped by only certain jurists, reducing the costs to the governmental
entity.300
V. Conclusion
The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction conferred on the international community a legal device
whose objective is precisely to avert international child abductions. Its
tenets are consistent with the trend in international law toward making
the courts of one country more -accessible to the citizens of another.
The Convention achieves this result by opening the doors to other
Contracting States regardless of the existence of a custody order. Col-
laboration between the judicial and administrative authorities of Con-
tracting States has further allowed the Convention to obtain its twin
Convention in an international custody and abduction dispute. Mahmoody Interview, supra
note 82.
293 Garbolino, supra note 21, at 28.
294 Id, at 29.
295 Id. The National Judicial College, while it does not currently sponsor such a pro-
gram, "would be a logical institutuion to conduct a'comprehensive course on the application
of the [C]onvention" because it already provides comprehensive programs for judges. Id.
296 ld,
297 Mahmoody Interview, supra note 82 (Ms. Mahmoody indicated that many judges lack
even the knowledge that the Convention exists in the first place and attributed much of this
fact to the level at which the cases are heard because the judges are required to have an array
of knowledge and not necessarily an in-depth understanding of family law specifically.).
298 See Arenstein, supra note 82, at 1.
299 Garbolino, supra note 21, at 29.
300 Id,
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objectives: to secure the prompt return of the child to the State of its
habitual residence and to ensure that the rights of custody under the
law of a Contracting State are effectively respected.
Since its enactment some fifteen years ago, the Hague Convention
has proven to be an effective weapon in the struggle against parental
abductions and likewise has seen the return of many pawns-abducted
children-who have been caught up in the adult game of divorce.
The road to solving the problem of international parental kidnapping,
however, is far from over. Not all nations are currently bound by the
Convention's provisions, and those that are continually face the prob-
lem of educating their judicial officers and the public. Additionally, all
signatories must continually keep abreast of the case law under the
Convention so that its provisions can be consistently applied across in-
ternational borders. Ultimately, it is only through these publicized ac-
tivities, a general heightened awareness, and a larger sphere of
influence that the nightmare suffered by children, at the hands of
would-be abductors, can be forestalled.
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